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Controlling Chemicals Used To Make Illegal
Drugs: The Chemical Action Task Force and
the Domestic Chemical Action Group
The criminal justice system has become
extremely sophisticated in its efforts to
prevent and control drug trafficking. The
method most visible to the public, and most
often covered by the news media, is the
seizure of illicit drugs such as cocaine and
heroin. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) reported that in 1990
alone, 215,000 pounds of cocaine-with a
·treet value of $3 billion-were seized by
.1e Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S.
Coast Guard, and the U.S. Border Patrol. 1
The seizure of illicit drugs, however, is
only one aspect of our national drug control
strategy. Illicit drugs are the basis of an
illegal, deadly, and worldwide "industry."
Law enforcement agencies around the
world are attacking this industry not only
by interdiction of the drugs themselves, but
also through such methods as disrupting

From the Director
Chemicals diverted from legitimate commerce are used in the production of illicit
drugs such as cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, PCP, and LSD. In fact, most ofthe
cocaine smuggled into the United States is
processed with chemicals exported by
American and Western European companies, and nearly all methamphetamine,
LSD, and PCP are illegally manufactured
using chemicals from domestic and foreign
suppliers. Controlling the illegal diversion
and use of such chemicals is essential to
limiting the production of illicit drugs.
The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking
Act of 1988 has already proven effective in

money laundering operations, breaking up
drug distribution networks, and destroying
crops.
Another part of this many-faceted attack
on drug trafficking is the control of precursor and essential chemicals, which are
necessary to produce cocaine and heroin,
as well as LSD, PCP, and methamphetamine. In fact, during the last 2 years, the
Group of Seven Industrialized Nations (the
G-7), in cooperation with other countries
where precursor and essential chemicals
are prqduced, imported, or consumed, has
launched a concerted effort to control these
chemicals.
The United States is among the world's
leading producers of precursor and essential chemicals. And most Americans don't
realize that until 1989 much of the cocaine
entering our country was produced using

limiting the illicit international diversion of
so-called precursor chemicals. Just as money
laundering can be traced through financial
records, so can illicit drug production be traced
through the records of manufacturers and
dealers of raw materials used in drug production. The act has helped extend the awareness
of law enforcement agencies about the role of
essential and precursor chemicals in the illicit
drug trade.
This Research in Brief discusses what has been
done to curtail the diversion of chemicals for
illicit drug production within the United States
and outlines American involvement in
strengthening international controls on the
diversion of precursor and essential chemicals.
This Brief also discusses a new problem con-

essential chemicals manufactured in the
United States. This Research in Brief discusses what has been done to radically
curtail the diversion of chemicals for illicit
drug production within our own borders. It
also highlights U.S. invo lve ment in international efforts to stren the n ·ontrols on
the illicit diversion of pr~cursor and essential chemicals.

The role of chemicals in
illegal drug production
What are precursor and essential chemicals? All major illicit drugs except marijuana are either extracted or synthesized in
a process requiring chemicals. Some drugs
are extracted from plants. Cocaine, for
example, is extracted from the coca leaf.
Since cocaine already exists in the leaves
of the coca plant, no precursors are

fronting police and prosecutors across the
Nation : the control and disposition of
clandestine drug laboratories, which are
inexpensive to establish, easy to conceal,
and highly profitable.
Much of the information in this Briefwas
first gathered by the international Chemical
Action Task Force and the Domestic
Chemical Action Group. The National
Institute of Justice is pleased to have supported the activities of these groups, as
well as to.have distributed information on
their proceedings to the law enforcement
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involved in its production. Chemicals used
in the cocaine extraction process do not
become part of the cocaine molecule, but
because they are crucial to its manufacture,
they are categorized as essential chemicals.
Other drugs, like LSD and PCP, are substances that do not occur in nature and,
therefore, are synthesized in a clandestine
laboratory from precursor chemicals,
which do become part of the drug's
molecular structure.
Synthetic drugs such as amphetamines and
many hallucinogens can be produced in
large or small laboratories. Cocaine, on the
other hand, is present in the leaves of the
coca plant in very small concentrations.
Therefore, large amounts of leaves and
solvents are required for the extraction
process. The coca leaves are wet with
water, and a base such as lime is added.
Kerosene or some other organic solvent is
then used to extract the cocaine from the
macerated coca leaves. A dilute aqueous
solution of an acid such as sulfuric acid
separates the cocaine from the kerosene;
ammonia water precipitates the cocaine,
which is dried as coca paste. The coca
paste is purified with an oxidizing agent
such as potassium permanganate and additional processing. An acid such as hydrochloric acid produces the final product,
cocaine hydrochloride.
Synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine
are made by chemical processes involving
precursor as well as essential chemicals.
Precursors to methamphetamine include
such substances as phenyl-2-propanone
(P2P) or ephedrine. In the synthesis, the
precursor is incorporated as part of the
methamphetamine molecule. Essential
chemicals such as solvents and compounds
are used to adjust the reaction conditions.

The chemical diversion
operation
Why should State and local law enforcement officials concern themselves about
essential and precursor chemicals? If they
could be kept out of the hands of illicit
drug manufacturers, these chemicals could
not be used to produce such drugs. If law
enforcement agencies can follow the trail
of precursor and essential chemicals from
the chemical manufacturer to the illicit
user, the illicit drug producers could be
identified and apprehended. Thus, the
control of precursors and essentials is a

potent strategy that, along with interdiction, intelligence, and financial investigation, can help identify drug criminals and
interfere with their operations.
International diversion of essential
chemicals. ONDCP has estimated that the
world supply of cocaine in 1990 was I ,000
metric tons, or about 2.2 million pounds.
To produce this amount of cocaine, millions of pounds of essential chemicals were
required for processing. Yet, it is not easy
to identify essential chemicals that are
bound for illicit uses. Many essential
chemicals such as hydrochloric acid, ether,
and acetone also have hundreds of legitimate uses. They are produced in the
United States by the thousands of tons, and
many thousands of businesses use them
daily.
Since most essential chemicals have a
wide variety of uses, they are common
substances in international trade. Thousands of tons are shipped annually to
foreign ports for industrial purposes.
Ironically, while cocaine destined for the
United States often has come from Latin
America, prior to 1988, many of the essential chemicals used in its production were
manufactured here at home.
In 1988, the United States exported some
90,000 metric tons of essential chemicals
to Latin America. Over 80 percent of the
methyl ethyl ketone, 90 percent of the
acetone, and 70 percent of the potassium
permanganate imported into Latin America
that year originated in the United States.2
However, the Chemical Diversion and
Trafficking Act of 1988, described below,
has greatly decreased U.S. exports of these
substances to Latin America.
Essential chemicals reach the drug producers in a variety of ways. (Exhibit 1 illustrates how these chemicals can be diverted
to illegal use.) Criminals may obtain these
substances from manufacturers through
theft, bribery of employees, or even legal
purchase, especially in areas that lack
chemical control laws or do not enforce
such laws. Tracing the diversion of these
substances is difficult because of poor
production and shipping records and poor
identification of customers. Of course,
poor plant security can always result in
theft. Retailers and wholesalers of the
chemicals can make direct cash sales to
drug manufacturers; sometimes the retailers themselves are "front companies" set

2

up to disguise illicit drug trade. However /
it should be noted that the majority of '
chemical manufacturers and dealers refuse
to participate in these illegal and substandard industry practices.
The vast international network of freight
forwarders, brokers, and agents can afford
criminals access to these chemicals
through multiple sales transactions, similar
to money laundering operations. Multiple
changes in ownership of the product as it
goes from port to port also can be deceptive and confusing for customs officials,
thus permitting diversion for illicit use. Of
course, overseas shipments also are subject
to theft because of the lack of physical
control.
In ports and free trade zones, criminals can
obtain essential and precursor chemicals
through such subterfuges as repacking or
relabeling of materials.
Finally, drug producers can conserve their
stocks of essential chemicals by recycling
them or recovering them from the disposal
processes of legitimate sources.
As controls over the manufacturing and
distribution processes improve worldwid<
the illicit drug manufacturers still may
have several options by which to continue
drug production. The chemicals used in
drug production can be substituted with
other, nonlisted materials that have similar
chemical properties. Also, criminals can
buy the chemical raw materials and make
the precursor and essential substances
themselves. Front companies may make
and sell these chemicals legally, while
"backroom operations" concoct the illegal
substances. "Smurfing"-buying quantities of each substance just under the level
at which reporting is required-is also how
criminals commonly obtain materials.
However, these options greatly add to the
criminals ' costs, and proper regulation and
recordkeeping requirements make it increasingly likely that even these diversion
methods will result in detection of illicit
operations.
Domestic clandestine labs and precursor
chemicals. Although the processing of the
coca leaf to make cocaine, for example,
requires a large-scale operation, many
synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine
and PCP can be produced in someone's
home (although venting of fumes is a
problem) with readily available laboratory
equipment. In fact, a criminal using

Exhibit 1. Diversion of Precursor Chemicals
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equipment and precursor chemicals worth
$200 can in 18 hours produce a batch of
methamphetamine with a street value of
$98,000. 3
The problem of clandestine labs increased
at an alarming rate throughout the 1980's.
It peaked in 1989 with the implementation
of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking
Act, which dramatically reversed this
trend. While police seized 226 clandestine
labs in 1983, by 1989 this number had
increased to 807--Dr well over 2 per day. 4
However, the-number of clandestine lab

• Diversion of
substances meant
for disposal

seizures decreased by 35 percent to 521 in
1990 and by 28 percent in 1991 to 375.
The greater difficulty criminals had in
obtaining precursor chemicals was clearly
a major factor in the decline in seizures.
These seizures pose special problems for
law enforcement officers. Many of the
chemicals used in drug manufacturing are
dangerous. Acids and solvents are corrosive and flammable; some are highly explosive. About one-fifth of clandestine lab
seizures result from reports of fires caused
by the chemical processes. According to a
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• Recycling of vital
substances and
solvents

study in Califomia,5 one-tenth of seized
labs have been boobytrapped with explosives, or worse, with disfiguring and poisonous chemical devices. Also, the
corrosive nature of many precursor and
essential chemicals can cause lung and eye
damage, even upon exposure to vapors
emanating from the lab.
At present, much clandestine lab activity
is occurring in the west coast States of
California, Oregon, and Washington.
However, as law enforcement officials in
these States have increased their efforts

against clandestine labs, the phenomenon
has spread across the country. Texas also
had a major clandestine lab problem, but
increased enforcement resulted in the relocation of these labs to neighboring States
like Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas.fi
However, Oklahoma recently has reported
a dramatic decline in clandestine lab activity, attributable to enforcement of a strict
State chemical control law.

e To keep retrievable records of the distri-

The problem is not just one for urban jurisdictions. In fact, illegal drug manufacturers
often set up labs in rural areas where strong
fumes, suspicious bottles, and drums of
chemicals are less likely to be detected.
Highway patrols often get involved in lab
seizures because some criminals keep the
labs in trucks or mobile homes which can
be moved frequently to escape detection.

ers, whether individuals or companies.

The diversion of precursor chemicals for
use in clandestine labs is similar to the
diversion of essential chemicals described
earlier. As with essential chemicals, many
precursors have legitimate applications
in medicine, manufacturing, and other
industries.

Anti-diversion legislation
The principal U.S. statute to control the
diversion of precursor and essential chemicals is the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act, Subtitle A of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Amendments of 1988 (Title VI,
Public Law 100--670), which amended the
Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act
(21 U.S.C. 802 et seq.) The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act established
recordkeeping requirements and enforcement activities for precursor and essential
chemicals. It originally listed 12 precursor
chemicals and 8 essential chemicals that
must be controlled to prevent their use in
illegal drug production; machines for
tableting or encapsulating drugs are also
controlled. State and Federal laws make the
unauthorized trade in these substances
equivalent to trafficking in the actual illegal
drugs. In November 1990, 12 new chemicals were added to the list, and I was deleted. (Additional amendments to the
Federal Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act were proposed, but were not passed
by Congress.)
The Federal anti-diversion act has three
basic requirements for all manufacturers
and distributors:

bution, receipt, sale, importation, or exportation of any of the chemicals or machines
on the list (there are threshold limits for
each chemical, below which records need
not be kept).

e

To report certain unusual or suspicious
orders for these substances to the DEA.

e To obtain proof of identity for customThe Chemical Diversion and Trafficking
Act gives the DEA authority to stop the
import or export of precursor and essential
chemicals if their use cannot be shown to
have legitimate medical, scientific, or commercial purposes. As the lead Federal
agency for combating the manufacture and
distribution of illegal drugs, the DEA also
is responsible for preventing the diversion
of licitly produced drugs and chemicals.
All imports or exports of precursors and
essentials over the threshold limit must be
reported to the DEA through an Import/
Export Declaration (DEA Form 486), and
shipments of all listed chemicals through
the United States must be reported to the
DEA at least IS days before the shipment.
The DEA has 19 regional offices across
the country with which manufacturers and
distributors of listed chemicals must
reports under certain defined circumstances. The DEA also has the power to
suspend shipments of chemicals when the
agency has evidence that the shipment may
be diverted for illicit purposes.

file

A total of 24 precursor and 7 essential
chemicals are now on the list. Failure to
comply with the more technical requirements of the law can result in up to I year
in prison and a civil penalty of up to
$25,000 per violation. For distributing one
of these substances knowing that it will be
used for illicit purposes, the penalty is up
to I0 years in prison and a fine of up to
$250,000 for individuals; up to $500,000
for corporations. [See 21 U.S.C. 841 (d)
(2); 18 u.s.c. 3571.]
These regulations already have been successful in controlling the export of essential chemicals to Latin American cocaine
factories. In 1988, 55 percent of the imports of essential chemicals to Colombia
originated in the United States. In 1989,
this amount had decreased to 33 percent of
imports. Overall, the export of essential
chemicals to Latin America from the
United States dropped from 133 metric
tons in 1984 to 40 metric tons in 1989.
4

Multinational Task Force
Formed To Halt Diversion
of Chemicals
The intemutional Chemical Action
Task Force ( ATF> Willi formed to
pre ent the divel'!iion of chemicals
from legitimate commerce to the
nuu1ufacturc of illicit drugs. CATF
members included the Group of
Seven lndustriali7.ed Nation. , known
ns the G-7 (Canuda, Fmnce. Italy.
Oennany, Japan. the United Kingdom. United Stales., nnd the Europeun
Community), 3s well UJ Argentina.
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia. Bntzil,
Chile. Colombia. Ecuador. Hungary,
India, the ethcrlands. Pakistan, Peru.
pain, whzerland. and Thailand. The
Organi7.ation of American States and
the Jntemational Narcotics Control
Soard nlso participated.

The 0-7 wn fil'!it tonned during the
Ford administmtion . o that the major
industrial powers could discuss joint
policy approaches toward critical
world economic problems.

In addition to Federal legislation, 18 States
have enacted their own laws on the control
of these substances. There are, of course,
some variations among those State laws in
terms of the chemicals controlled and the
method of regulation and recordkeeping.
To foster uniformity among States, the
National Institute of Justice, iri coordination with the DEA and the U.S. Department of Justice's Criminal Division,
launched an initiative with the American
Prosecutors Research Institute (an affiliate
of the National District Attorneys Association) to draft a model State statute for
the control of precursor and essential
chemicals.

The Chemical Action Task Force
Of course, the decrease in exports of these
chemicals from the United States would be
meaningless if other chemical-producing
nations did not cooperate. Unfortunately,
the effectiveness of the U.S. Chemical
Diversion and Trafficking Act has been
limited because other chemical-producing
countries began to take up the slack in
supplying South American countries with

:ssential chemicals. The United Nations
.tddressed this important problem in Article 12 of the U.N. Convention Against
lllicil Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, signed in Vienna in
1988 by more than 80 nations. This convention initially applied only to the 12
chemicals, but the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs recently recommended to the U.N. Secretary General that
I 0 chemicals be added. This addition is
expected to be effective in the autumn or
1992. The convention imposed some requirements on countries to regulate the
international commerce in chemicals. The
United Nations also identified some regulatory measures that countries could take to
control diversion within their borders.
Although the 1988 U.N. convention was a
first step toward the control of these
chemicals in intemational trade, countries
must do more to control diversion. Recognizing this, the G-7, at its economic summit meeting in Houston in July 1990,
called for the establishment of a multinational Chemical Action Task Force
(CATF). At the Houston meeting, President George Bush and the prime ministers
md other govemment officials from the
G-7 members recognized the importance
of curbing the illegal diversion and use of
precursor and essential chemicals. The G7 participants directed that the CATF make
recommendations to prevent the diversion
of these substances from legitimate commerce to the manufacture of illicit drugs.
The U.S. Government organized the CATF
in 1990, and the U.S. Depmtment of Justice chaired the task force, which met six
times in Washington, D.C., between October 1990 and May 1992. During its first
year, the chainnan of the international
group was William P. Barr, then the
Deputy Attorney General, and currently
the Attorney General of the United States;
Deputy Attomey General George J.
Terwilliger III assumed the chairmanship
in the spring of 1992.

The Domestic Chemical
Action Group
The Department of Justice sought to
ensure that its delegates to the CATF
remained infonned about the views and
:oncerns of State and local officials on this
issue so they could accurately portray the
status of U.S . law enforcement efforts. For
this purpose, the National Institute of Jus-

Domestic Chemical Action
Group Members
The National Institute of Justice convened a Domestic Chemical Action
Group (DCAG) to asse!.s U.S. law
enforcement efforts to prevent illicit
use of chemic<Jls and accurately portray those efforts to the Chemical
Action Task Force. The DC AG included leading experts on issues related to the diversion of chemicals and
clmu1estine dn1g labs. Members
included:

Association representath·es
National Fraternal Order of Police
National Criminal Justice
Association
International Association of
Chiefs of Police
National Association of Attorneys
General
U.S. Conference of Mayors
Chemical Manufacturers
Association
National District Attomeys
Association

States represented by practitioners
Washington
California
Pennsylvania
Texas
Colorado

Components of the U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Drug Enforcement Administration
Criminal Division
Office of Justice Programs.
including the National Institute of
Justice
Attorney General Ken Eikenberry of
Washington State, and Michael Scott,
Commander of the Narcotics Service
of the Texas Department of Public
Safety. were named spokespersons for
the group and joined the U.S. delegation at the 1990 and 1991 Chemical
Action Task Force meetings.

tice invited approximately 30 experts in the
area of chemical diversion from all over
the country to fom1 a Domestic Chemical
Action Group (DCAG).

while-collar crimes and money laundering
because investigation often entails finding
and following complex trai Is of paper
records.

The DCAG met in late October 1990 to
discuss the status of regulation of these
chemicals and to develop info1mation for
use in the CATF. These expe11s discussed
existing national controls on the diversion
of precursor and essential chemicals. In
comparison with other countries, the
United States is very sophisticated in these
efforts. Nevertheless, many problems
remain, and the DCAG identified a number of issues and made suggestions for
addressing some of them. These include:

Police are in particular need of training
because of the dangers involved in searching for and seizing clandestine labs. The
danger of explosions, as well as of burns
and lung damage from caustic chemicals,
requires special training in handling these
substances. Officers also must be made
more aware of ways to prevent the illegal
movement of these substances on highways and by other means of transportation .
In places where precursor and essential
chemicals are manufactured, sold, transported, or taken across international
boundaries, law enforcement otficcrs also
should be aware of the laws and regulations aimed at preventing diversion of
these substances to illegal use.

Training. Every component of the law
enforcement system requires training and
information on diversion. Judges and prosecutors may not recognize the seriousness
of the charges of diverting these substances
and may treat them more lightly than standard drug possession or distribution cases.
Also, prosecutors and police sometimes
are not fully aware of appropriate methods
for investigating and bringing to trial cases
involving diversion. Such cases resemble
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The DC AG stressed that training must
reach all areas or the law t~nrorcemenl
system since mral rolice agencies arc just
as likely to encounter clandestine labs as
urban police. Srecial training may be
necessary for highway patrols, as well as

other agencies in jurisdictions that have
large railroad and other transportation
hubs.
Environmental and occupational issues.
In addition, the DCAG noted the need for
law enforcement agencies to be aware of
environmental and occupational laws and
regulations associated with the seizure of
clandestine labs.
Because of the toxicity of the chemicals, a
law enforcement agency becomes liable
for various cleanup and transporting operations, for any damage to natural resource~,
and for subsequent health risks that remam
after the lab is dismantled. These requirements result from provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Ad and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 8
Also, the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act makes owners of
contaminated property responsible for
decontamination before it is sold. 9 Thus, if
a property is confiscated by a loc~l jurisdiction, seized through asset forfetture
laws, and subsequently sold, the jurisdiction may still be responsible for cleanup.
The DCAG also discussed the fact that law
enforcement agencies are required by
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations 10 to provide medical
monitoring, appropriate safety equipment,
and training for employees who work with
toxic substances. Jurisdictions must provide these services to police personnel who
raid toxic clandestine lab sites, according
to these regulations.
Additional legislation. The enactment of
Federal legislation has improved our effectiveness in controlling the international
movement of these substances. However,
several DCAG members called for more
potency in the Federal statutes. The DCAG
suggested that legislation be strengthened
by requiring licenses or permits for manufacturers of precursor and essential chemicals. In addition, longer waiting periods
before shipment could increase the level of
confidence that purchasers are legitimate
users, and more followup and recordkeeping could also ensure that sub~tances
are used for legitimate purposes. Fmally,
some group members sought to extend
controls to chemical analogs and other
substitutes for currently controlled precursor and essential substances.

The lack of legislation requiring recordkeeping in 33 States has cause~ pro?lems
in domestic efforts to control dtverston.
Without adequate recordkeeping requirements, there are no paper trails of diverted
chemicals. Criminals can camouflage
diversion by shuffling shipments through
States lacking controls.
Furthermore, even those States that have
legislation sometimes are inconsistent in
their regulatory requirements. Many
DCAG members called for more States to
adopt model legislation such as that developed by the American Prosecut?rs ~e- .
search Institute. This modellegtslatton ts
integrated with Federal laws and would
add to the effectiveness of the system of
controls that has already proved effective
in reducing illicit international trade.
Adoption of this model legislation by all
States, the DCAG suggested, could provide the same sort of control for interstate
diversion.
According to the DCAG, State legislation
on chemical diversion and trafficking
should include all federally listed substances and contain a clause that permits
rapid inclusion of new substances to the
Federal list without the need for a separate
review process. The DCAG also suggt<sted
that State laws include requirements for
recordkeeping and reporting, with all
records to be preserved for at least 4 years.
Members also saw a need for the legislation to provide assurances for keeping
sensitive business information confidential,
provide for subpoena power to obtain
access to records, and make forfeitures and
other penalties consistent with Federal
legislation.
Information systems. The complex systems of diversion developed by criminal
drug producers make it essential that law
enforcement agencies work together to
control this problem. The necessity for
investigators to follow circuitous ship~e?t
routes, as well as the ever-present posstbtlity that fraudulent documents will be used
in diversion, make it essential that law
enforcement agencies have access to up-todate, accurate information about amounts
being shipped, legitimate users, and lost or
stolen materials. The DCAG noted that a
nationwide information system, accessible
by Federal, State, and local agenci~s,
would help greatly in both preventmg and
investigating diversion. This system also
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could be tied into an international system
to help track imports and exports of these
substances.
The group also saw a need for creatin~ a
uniform reporting method on clandestme
lab statistics. Data on clandestine lab
activities and the amounts of chemicals
seized would give a better indication of the
extent of these enforcement activities and
their importance in halting the drug trade.

Chemical Action Task Force
recommendations
The international Chemical Action Task
Force met several times from 1990 to 1992
and created three working groups: Chemical Issues, Diversion Issues, and Legal
and Regulatory Issues. Each working
group gathered and analyzed information
from the experiences of CATF member
countries and the knowledge of expert
participants. Each group then made recommendations to the entire task force. The
reports of these groups, published in
1991, 11 are summarized below.
Chemical Issues Working Group. This
working group identified the specific
chemicals that should be regulated internationally. It examined chemicals used in the
manufacture of illicit drugs, including
heroin, cocaine, stimulant amphetamines,
LSD, PCP, methamphetamine, and
methaqualone. The working group recommended 10 additional substances for control and these have already been approved
for lnclusion in the 1988 U.N. convention.
Exhibit 2 is a list of precursor and essential
chemicals controlled by the U.N. convention, suggested by the CATF, and currently
controlled by the United States.
Diversion Issues Working Group. The
second group examined existing methods
for diverting chemicals and, in light of
existing business practices and domestic
and international laws and regulations,
sought appropriate ways to prevent diversion. This group surveyed member countries to determine their greatest problems
and concerns about diversion. Based on
this survey, the group prepared a comprehensive list of diversion methods. (See
exhibit 1.)
Legal and Regulatory Issues Working
Group. The third group focused on le~~l
and regulatory issues. It surveyed partici-

Exhibit 2. Precursor and Essential Chemicals Identified by CATF
Acetic anhydride*

Hydrochloric acid*

Acetone*

lsosafrole*

N-Acetylanthranilic acid*

Lysergic acid*

Ammonia (anhydrous)

Methyl alcohol

Ammonia in aqueous solution

Methylamine*

Ammonium hydroxide

3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone*

Anthranilic acid*

N-Methylephedrine*

Benzene

N-Methylpseudoephedrine*

Benzyl chloride*

Norpseudoephedrine •

Benzyl cyanide*

Petroleum ether (petroleum benzene)

2-Butanone (MEK)*

Phenylacetic acid*

Butyl acetate

Phenylpropanolamine*

Butyl alcohol

1-Phenyl-2-propanone (phenylacetone)

Calcium carbonate

Piperidine*

Calcium hydroxide

Piperonal*

Chloroform (Trichloromethane)

Potassium permanganate*

Diacetone alcohol (pyranton)

Propionic anhydride*

Ephedrine*

Pseudoephedrine*

Ergometrine (Ergonovine)*

Safrole*

Ergotamine*

Sodium bicarbonate

Ethyl acetate

Sodium carbonate

Ethylamine*

Sodium hydroxide

N-Ethylephedrine*

Sulfuric acid*

Ethyl ether*

Toluene*

N-Ethylpseudoephedrine*

Xylenes (Xyloles)

pating nations to determine their existing
laws and regulations on these substances.
The group also used the findings of the
first two groups as the basis for its recommendations. These recommendations are
directed toward all countries involved in
the legal manufacture, sale, distribution ,
transit, or use of essential and precursor
chemicals.
The working group recommended that the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of
chemical products with the aim of manufacturing narcotics and other illicit drugs
should constitute a violation of narcotics
legislation and should be prosecuted in the
same manner as drug trafficking. The

• Vigilance. All commercial operators
who deal with essential and precursor
chemicals must remain alert for efforts to
divert these substances for illicit purposes.
• Administrative surveillance. Accurate
records must be kept of all production and
transactions. These must be retained for a
minimum of 2 years. [The United States
already requires that records of transactions involving precursor chemicals be
kept for 4 years and that records of transactions involving essential chemicals be kept
for 2 years.]
• Registration and authorization.
Manufacturers of certain substances, particularly precursors, should be licensed to
make and sell them. This component is not
necessary for essential chemicals such as
acetone and ethyl ether that have wide industrial applications.
• Export authorization. Every country
should control its exports of these materials to prevent them from falling into the
hands of illicit enterprises.

Hexane
Hydriotic acid*

General recommendations. Building
upon the findings and recommendations of
its working groups, the CATF adopted a
final report in June 1991 that made general
recommendations about the control and
regulation of these substances. It suggested
that all affected countries develop control
programs with five key components:

*Regulated by the United States

group further recommended that all countries ratify the U.N. convention, but stated
that no proposal to reform the U.N. convention or annex should hinder a country
from improving its systems to control these
substances.
The group stressed that new regulations
should consider the need to preserve licit
commerce and avoid making a control
system so burdensome that it hinders commerce. Finally, the working group emphasized that international cooperation is
indispensable. All parties must satisfy
themselves about the legality and regularity of every shipment of precursor oressential chemicals.
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• Import authorization. Every country
also should be certain that imports of the
substances are not diverted to illicit drug
producers.
The task force made other recommendations about how to control this problem. It
called for greater U.N. funding for the International Narcotics Control Board and
suggested that the board give priority to
providing resources for communications,
equipment, and training. The task force
also called for governments to monitor
commerce to identify new substances used
in illicit drug production, as well as new
methods and patterns of diversion. It urged
countries involved in the production, transit, transshipment, and use of precursor and
essential chemicals to share information on
legitimate and illegitimate users. It also
suggested that all countries provide assistance in international law enforcement
efforts.

The task force urged that each country develop regulatory measures for every stage
of the distribution process (receipt, storage,
handling, processing, and delivery) of the
subject chemicals, particularly in free ports
and free trade zones. Finally, it suggested
that discrete international tariff codes be
developed to track each of the chemicals
more effectively.

Summary
If we are to control and defeat the drug
problem, our Nation's law enforcement
agencies must learn more about precursor
and essential chemicals and the role they
play in drug trafficking. Also, every jurisdiction must review and make certain that
its laws and policies meet the objective of
controlling the flow of these chemicals.
The regulation of precursor and essential
chemicals is a crucial component of efforts
to reduce the supply of illicit drugs. But it
is not just a national endeavor. The activities of the Chemical Action Task Force
and other international bodies demonstrate
the worldwide scope of this effort. Furthermore, State and local law enforcement
officials have an important role in making
certain that their jurisdictions do not unwittingly become a source of chemicals for
clandestine laboratories or a haven for
manufacturers of illegal drugs.
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